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NOTES
In the case first above cited25 the law of Kentucky, in which
state the contract in question was made, had been settled by judicial
decision since 1892.26 Under those decisions the contract in question
would have fallen as monopolistic. Thus the public policy of Ken-
tucky was involved, the merits of which do not concern us here.
The federal court chose to find what the law and public policy of
Kentucky ought to be rather than the law of the case. It happened
(due to the work of some lawyer familiar with the federal rule, no
doubt) that one of the contracting parties was a foreign corpora-
tion.2 7 If it had been a local one and the case had arisen in Ken-
tucky the ruling would doubtless have been the reverse of that
actually made. The case leaves Kentucky with two conflicting rules
of decision with reference to the same transaction. It certainly
does not strike one as a case involving the independence of the fed-
eral judiciary versus subservience to the state courts, but rather as
one wherein the federal courts failed in their obligation to apply
state law as they find it. Whatever justification there may be in the
historical background of the law merchant for the federal rule as
applied to commercial paper, that very rule itself fails of application
in a case like the Kentucky one, which involves a question of local
interest only.
J. B. FORDEIAM.
MARSHALING ASSETS IN FAVOR OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR
Where one creditor has a lien on two properties in the hands of
the same debtor, and another creditor has a lien on only one of
them, the latter, in equity, may frequently force the former to pro-
ceed first against the singly charged estate,' provided the rights of
the double lienholder are not prejudiced thereby,2 and provided also
that the two properties so charged are more than sufficient to satisfy
25Cab Co. v. Cab Co., supra note 2.
McConnell v. Pedago, 92 Ky. 465, 18 S. W. 15 (1892) ; Palmer Transfer
Co. v. Anderson, 131 Ky. 217, 115 S. W. 182 (1909).
2' Cab. Co. v. Cab Co., supra note 2. The fortunate cab company was a
Tennessee corporation. One issue in the case was whether there was a genuine
diversity of citizenship since it appeared that the Tennessee cab company had
only recently changed its place of incorporation from Kentucky to Tennessee.
'Pope v. Harris, 94 N. C. 62 (1886) ; Harrington v. Furr, 172 N. C. 610,
90 S. E. 775 (1916) ; Trust Co. v. Godwin, 190 N. C. 512, 130 S. E. 323 (1925).
Leading case: Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves. Jr. 382, 32 Reprints 402, 18 E. R. C.
198.
'Jones v. Zollicoffer, 9 N. C. 623, 11 Am. Dec. 795 (1823); Knight v.
Rountree, 99 N. C. 389, 6 S. E. 762 (1888).
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the double lienholder's claim. Otherwise, such a course would be
unnecessary. The reason usually given for this procedure is that it
prevents the paramount creditor by his caprice from exhausting the
estate against which the junior creditor is secured, and prevents the
debtor from getting back either fund free of any incumbrance.8
Where, however, the doubly charged estate has already been pro-
ceeded against before the singly secured creditor has taken any
steps, or where, in a proceeding of the sort first referred to, it seems
best to permit the senior lienholder to go first against the doubly
charged estate, the junior creditor is held to be subrogated to the
senior creditor's interest, to the extent that the latter has exhausted
the singly secured creditor's original resources. 4 Frequently, the
junior creditor proceeds by way of injunction,5 if he has been alert
enough to anticipate the other's tactics. And sometimes the question
is raised in connection with a decree for distribution of the proceeds
of the sale of both properties. 6 While the term "marshaling of
assets" is commonly used with reference to all of the situations here
suggested, it is more characteristic of that first mentioned. There
are a few statutes regulating marshaling, but these seem only declara-
tory of the case law.7
In favor of what types of interest and against what types will a
court of equity invoke marshaling?
A junior creditor may not thus proceed against the government
for taxes due in respect to the two lots.8 Nor can he compel a
senior creditor first to proceed against the homestead,9 unless, except
where one is not permitted to waive the homestead exemption, that
estate has been encumbered by the debtor's consent. These results
'PomERoy, EQuITY JURSPRUDENCE, Student's Edition, §1414; Aldrich v.
Cooper, supra note 1; Pope v. Harris, 94 N. C. 62 (1886); Harrington v.
Rawls, 136 N. C. 65, 48 S. E. 571 (1904).
'Ross v. Duggan, 5 Colo. 85 (1879); Jones v. Zollicoffer, supra, note 2;
Hudkins v. Word, 30 W. Virginia 204, 3 S. E. 600, 8 Am. S. R. 22 (1887).
7 Jones v. Zollicoffer, supra, note 2; Dickson v. Back, 32 Or. 217, 51 P. 727,
732, 733 (1897).
'Gotzian v. Shakman, 89 Wis. 52, 61 N. W. 304, 46 Am. St. Rep. 820
(1894).
'See Ash v. Fitzgerald Cotton Oil Co., 27 Ga. A. 35, 107 S. E. 342 (1921);
Harvison v. Griffin, 32 N. D. 188, 155 N. W. 655 (1915); Kent v. Williams,
114 Cal. 537, 46 P. 462 (1896).
'Husbands v. Paducah, 12 Ky. Op. 201 (1883), holding that taxes are not
debts, and thus not subject to marshaling. But see Darby v. Vinnedge, 53
Ind. A. 525, 100 N. E. 862 (1913).
'Pope v. Harris, supra, note 1; Butler v. Stainback, 87 N. C. 216 (1882);
Harris v. Allen, 104 N. C. 86, 10 S. E. 127 (1889).
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are due to the effect of the countervailing policies involved. And in
Winston v. Biggs,'° the North Carolina court refused to permit a
trustee for the benefit of otherwise unsecured creditors to compel
one of the beneficiaries to proceed first under a prior mortgage upon
part of the property conveyed in the deed of trust, before resorting
to the funds held by the trustee. This was apparently because of
the supposed impropriety of the trustee interfering with an advan-
tage conferred by the direction of the settlor. The result, however,
seems unfair to the other creditors. The doctrine of marshaling
has been criticized as being unfair to the unsecured creditors," by
giving to an already secured creditor an advantage never bargained
for. It would seem that the failure to marshal in this case would be
subject to the same criticism.
One need not, however, be technically a creditor, in order to
invoke marshaling. Before the Married Women's Property Act,
where the husband had died indebted, the English court of equity
frequenty required his creditors, at the request of the widow, to go
first against the other personal estate, and then the land, before
resorting to the widow's personal paraphernalia.' 2 And in Young
v. Trustees of Davidson College,13 the North Carolina court per-
mitted the purchaser of land subject to a charge incident to partition
to institute proceedings to compel the owner of that charge to mar-
shal. The decision, however, went off on the ground that the owner
of the charge had a claim against only the plaintiff's lot.
Under what circumstances may a judgment creditor invoke mar-
shaling? The distinction has been made that a subsequent judgment
creditor who has obtained a specific lien by virtue of an attachment,
execution or otherwise, is not in a position, as is a subsequent con-
tractual lienholder, to object to marshaling as between prior lien-
holders.' 4 This is both because he stands in the position of the
debtor, and because he did not give value, without notice of the other
'117 N. C. 206, 23 S. E. 316 (1895).
"Langdell, C. C., A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARvA LAW
R.viEw 55, at pages 69, 70 (1887).
Snelson v. Corbett and Delves, 3 Atkins 370, 26 English Reports 1013
(1746) ; Tipping v. Tipping, 1 Peere Williams 729, 24 English Reports 589
(1721) ; Tynt v. Tynt, 2 Peere Williams 542, 24 English Reports 853 (1729).
See also Howard v. Menifee, 5 Pike (Ark.) 668 (1842).62 N. C. 261 (1867).
"The Oliva A. Carrigan, 7 Fed. 507 (1881); Kendig v. Landis, 135 Pa.
612, 19 A. 1058 (1890).
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creditor's equity, in reliance on the security offered by the debtor,
as would often be true of the contractual lienholder.
It has been held in Ireland that "a judgment creditor has no spe-
cific lien on the land, but only a general lien over all the estate of
his debtor. A general creditor does not stand in the same right as
a specific incumbrancer, and therefore, in ninety-nine cases out of
one hundred, he cannot have any relief against a mortgagee who
has a specific lien."'15 On the contrary, it has frequently been stated
by American courts and writers that a judgment creditor may invoke
marshaling. These remarks, however, are largely if not uniformly
found in connection with situations where the judgment creditor
had already obtained a specific lien by attachment, execution, or
otherwise. 16 And relief by way of marshaling has usually been
given to one in the postion of a mortgagee, an equitable mortgagee, 17
the holder of a mechanic's' 8 or vendor's lien,19 or other specific
incumbrance. 20
In this connection, the recent Virginia case of Kidwell v. Hem-.
derson2l is of particular interest. There a judgment creditor sought
to compel marshaling, claiming a specific lien both by virtue of the
fact that his judgment was for the unpaid balance of the purchase
price of one of the lots, and because his judgment, by confession, had
been made a lien upon this lot only. The court, however, refused
to accord to his judgment any more or different significance by
way of lien than that incident to any other judgment. He had no
vendor's lien, his position being apparently due to his having financed
the purchase. And the restriction of the judgment as a lien to one
upon the particular lot mentioned was held beyond the power of
the court. While the refusal of the court to permit marshaling in
favor of the judgment creditors was due in part to certain other
'Averall v. Wade, Lloyd and Goold, 252, 262, 10 Cond. Eng. Ch. 498(1835); Re Fox, 5 I. Ch. R. 541, P. C. (1856).
"38 Corpus Juris, Marshaling Assets and Securities, paragraph 19, note 12,
and cases there cited. Compare Burgess v. Hitt, 21 Mo. Appeals, 313 (1886):
"We do not mean to say that the doctrine of marshaling securities is not in
any case applied except in favor of a party who has a lien on a portion of
the fund." See also, Young v. Trustees of Davidson College, mepra, note 13.
'Kidwell v. Henderson, 143 S. E. 336, 340 (Va,, 1928).
'Hamilton v. Schwehr, 34 Md. 107 (1870); but see Coburn v. Stephens,
137 Ind. 683, 36 N. E. 132, 45 Am. St. R. 218 (1894).
" Gordon v. Bell, 50 Ala. 213 (1874).
' Wolfe v. Houston etc. Land Co., 44 Tex. Civ. A. 379, 98 S. W. 1069(1907).
143 S. E. 336 (Va., 1928).
NOTES
factors, it seems to rest, so far as this aspect of the case is concerned,
upon the tacit assumption that a mere judgment creditor is not in a
position to invoke marshaling of assets. So long as the process is to
be confined to the relative privileges of specific lienholders, the re-
sult seems sound.
J. W. CREw, JR.
BANKER'S LIENS ON DEPOSITS SUBSEQUENT TO INDEBETEDNESS
The question arises in a recent Virginia case1 as to a bank's right
to set off a depositor's indebtedness to it against his balance on
simple account when the money deposited was of a fiduciary char-
acter, the bank having no notice or knowledge of this fact, and
when the debt had been created before this deposit. These funds
were the proceeds of a note collected by the depositor for the plain-
tiff, another bank, which now seeks to show its equities and defeat
the set-off. Held: Plaintiff bank cannot recover.
There is an absence of decision on this question in North Caro-
lina. The cases in other states are in conflict, the weight of author-
ity, however, being in accord with the principal case.
Where the depositary has knowledge that the money deposited
belonged to a third person,2 or where the circumstances are such as
to compel an inquiry3 as to the relation between the depositor and
the funds deposited, no set-off is allowed, on the equitable principle
that one who knows or should know that certain property belongs
to another cannot deal with it in such manner as to interfere with or
extinguish the other's rights thereto. Where, however, the deposi-
tary has extended credit or has in any other way changed its position
to its detriment in reliance upon the credit of the funds deposited
without notice of another's interest therein it is conceded that the
bank may retain as against the beneficial owner.4 This conclusion
is reached in some jurisdictions on the general grounds that where
Federal Reserve Bank v. State and City Bank, 143 S. E. 697 (Va., 1928).
'Central National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693
(1881) ; Union Stockyards Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411, 11 Sup. Ct. 118,
26 L. Ed. 693 (1890); U. S. v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 269 U. S. 504, 46.
Sup. Ct. 179, reversing decree in 287 F. 971 (C. C. A. N. Y., 1924).
'Union Stockyard Bank v. Moor et al, 79 F. 705, 25 C. C. A. 150 (1897).
'Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 212, 12 L.
Ed. 409 (1847); Brady v. American National Bank, 120 Okla. 159, 250 Pac.
1006 (1926); South West Nat. Bank v. Evans, 94 Okla. 185, 221 Pac. 53
(1923).
